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Case No. 20100024 - S C 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Respondent/ Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Larry Lewis Hutchings, 
Petitioner/ Defendant. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault 
and criminal mischief in an unpublished memorandum decision. State v. Hutchings, 
2009 UT App 330 (Addendum A). This Court granted Defendant's request for a 
writ of certiorari, and accordingly has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 
78A-3-102(3)(a) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
This Court granted review of two issues: 
1. Whether "the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
instruction defining intentional conduct in relation to causation of serious bodily 
injury under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a)." 
2. "Whether Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective." 
Standard of Review. "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the district court. The court of appeals' decision is reviewed 
for correctness." State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ^ 8, 147 P.3d 425 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-103 (West 2004), Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-
102 (West 2004), and Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 (West 2004) are attached as 
Addendum B.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS* 
Defendant kicks down his girlfriend's door and assaults her 
In April 2004, Defendant convinced his girlfriend, Deborah Cuddeback, to 
move to Utah from New York with her 14-year-old daughter, promising her that 
they could live in a house that he owned. R. 271:131; 272:24-26. But when Deborah 
and her daughter arrived, they learned that Defendant did not actually own a home. 
1
 The Legislature amended Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 during the 2010 
legislative session. All statutory references in this brief are to the versions in effect 
at the time of the crime. 
2
 The "evidence and all reasonable inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it" are recited "in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992) (quotations and citation omitted). 
2 
R. 271:131-32; 272: 36. Instead, Defendant agreed to pay rent on an apartment for 
them to live in. R. 272: 33. 
Defendant spent the night at Deborah's apartment "[q]uite a bit," but he 
"never lived there." R. 272:34,39; see also R. 271:63-64; 272:38,117. In fact, some of 
Deborah's neighbors testified that they had never seen him until the morning of the 
assault. R. 272:101-02,110. 
Defendant and Deborah fought "all the time." R. 272: 40. At one point, 
Deborah took Defendant's key away because she feared that he would steal her 
belongings and sell them. R. 272: 39-40. 
In early April 2006, Defendant and Deborah had a "fight" after she left him 
stranded at work without giving him a ride home. R. 272: 48. A few days later, 
Deborah awoke to the sound of Defendant pounding on her door. R. 272:48. When 
Deborah told Defendant through the door to go away, Defendant demanded that 
she let him inside. R. 272: 49-50. Defendant was "very angry and screaming and 
yelling." R. 272: 50. When Deborah refused to let him in, Defendant began kicking 
at the door. R. 272: 50. 
Deborah's front door had three locks: one on the doorknob, a deadbolt, and a 
chain. R. 272:49. Although all three were engaged, Defendant was able to break in 
by kicking the door out of its frame. R. 271: 65; 272: 50-51 (explaining that the 
3 
"whole right hand side" of the door "just came out of the door frame," and that the 
"wall was broke[n]"). 
Deborah "yelled at him and told him he needed to get out." R. 272: 50-51. 
But Defendant did not get out. Instead, he "grabbed" Deborah by the neck, "threw 
[her] over the couch," and began choking her. R. 272: 51. When Deborah said that 
"he was hurting [her]," Defendant responded that he "was going to kill" her. R. 
272: 51-52. 
Deborah "almost blacked out" from a lack of oxygen. R. 272: 52. She had 
"very long finger nails," though, and began "jab[bing]" at Defendant. R. 272: 52. 
She cut his forehead, drawing blood, and was then able to get off the couch and run 
toward a back bedroom. R. 272: 52-53. 
Defendant chased after her and tackled her. R. 272:53. As the two struggled 
on the floor, Defendant "grabbed [her] wrist and threw [her] hand backwards," 
smashing it into a large wooden object against the wall. R. 272: 55-56.3 Deborah's 
hand "immediately hurt" and began swelling "up huge." R. 272:56. Witnesses who 
later saw it said that it looked "black and blue," "purple," "very swollen," and 
"gruesome." R. 271:12, 68; 272:122. 
3
 Deborah was later unsure whether her hand had struck a wooden bookshelf 
or a nearby wooden breadbox. R. 272: 56. 
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Deborah asked Defendant whether he planned to kill her. R. 272:56. At that 
point, Defendant abruptly stopped his assault, got off her, and retrieved some 
cigarettes from the kitchen. R. 272: 57. Deborah asked him: "How do you think 
you're going to get away with this? The door frame's hanging all over the place." 
R. 272: 58. Defendant grabbed a small object from the door and started pounding 
the door frame back into place "so no one would know that he had kicked the door 
in." R. 272: 57-58. 
Several of Deborah's neighbors had heard the commotion. R. 272:101,118. 
One of them, a 12-year-old girl who lived across the hall, looked out the peephole in 
her door at the beginning of the confrontation. R. 272: 101. She saw Defendant 
"pounding on the door, telling her to let him in." R. 272: 101. When she saw 
Defendant kick open the door, she was "scared" and called the police. R. 272:102. 
Police officers arrived while Defendant was still trying to repair the door 
frame. R. 271: 7. After securing the scene, an officer interviewed Deborah. R. 271: 
12. He saw "discoloration" on her hand, as well as "some bruising." R. 271:12. The 
hand looked "very swollen as if possibly the knuckles or the bones had been 
brokefn], or there was some pretty good severe trauma to the hand." R. 271:12. 
Deborah could not "move her fingers very well." R. 271:12. When the officer asked 
5 
her to write a witness statement, she could not, and she accordingly had to dictate it 
to a friend. R. 271:13. 
Deborah was taken to the emergency room. R. 271: 36. The attending 
physician noted signs of "strangulation trauma" on her neck. R. 271: 38. The 
physician testified that the trauma he observed was consistent with her account of 
having been choked during an assault. R. 271: 50. 
The physician also noted that Deborah's hand was "very swollen." R. 271:36. 
X-rays showed that the bone beneath her index finger was "shattered into dozens of 
pieces and was a little bit displaced." R. 271:39. The physician explained that these 
injuries were consistent with Deborah's claim that her hand had struck a hard object 
while being thrust backwards. R. 271:39,50-51. He also explained that the injuries 
were inconsistent with those she would have received while punching something. 
R. 271:39,50-51. According to the doctor, there is a "characteristic type of a fracture 
that occurs when you punch something," and the injuries to Deborah's hand did not 
fit that fracture pattern. R. 271: 40. 
As a result of the broken bones, Deborah subsequently had difficulties in her 
job as a housekeeper. R. 272: 66. She now had limited mobility in her hand and 
could not form a fully closed fist. R. 272: 67. Her hand would get sore and hurt 
while doing certain job-related tasks, such as cleaning toilets. R. 272: 66-67. 
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The Charges 
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and 
criminal mischief. R. 4-5. With respect to the aggravated assault charge, the 
information alleged that Defendant had violated Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-
103(l)(a) (West 2004). R. 5. As set forth in the version of that statute then in effect, a 
person committed aggravated assault by "committing] assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102/' and by "intentionally caus[ing] serious bodily injury to another/' Id. 
With respect to the aggravated burglary charge, the State was required to 
prove, among others, that Defendant had "enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully" in 
Deborah's apartment. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (West 2004). The State initially 
sought leave to prove this by showing that as a convicted sex offender, Defendant 
was not entitled to live in the apartment with Deborah and her 14-year-old 
daughter. R. 72-79. The trial court denied that request before trial, concluding that 
evidence of Defendant's prior conviction and parole conditions would violate rule 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 153:16-17. Thus, the State's burglary prosecution 
at trial was based solely on evidence that Defendant was not living at the apartment 
at the time of his forced entry. 
7 
Defendant claims that he was the victim of Deborah's assault 
Defendant testified at trial. R. 271:92-143. Defendant claimed that although 
he had been living elsewhere for much of 2004-2006, he had moved into Deborah's 
apartment in March 2006. R. 271: 95. He then claimed that after their fight a few 
days earlier, he had spent several days sleeping on a friend's couch without access 
to food or cigarettes. R. 271:105-09. 
Defendant admitted going to Deborah's apartment that morning, as well as to 
kicking her door out of its frame when she refused to let him in. R. 271:114,121, 
129-30. According to Defendant, however, Deborah attacked him without 
provocation before he could come inside. R. 271:114. Defendant said that Deborah 
choked him and scratched his face, but that he was able to push her off him. R. 271: 
116-17. Defendant said that rather than leaving, he went to get his cigarettes from 
the kitchen, at which point Deborah "came at me again." R. 271:117. According to 
Defendant, Deborah tried punching him three times; she missed the first two times, 
but when Defendant "let [his] guard down," she tried a third time, this time hitting 
him in the face. R. 272:118-20. Defendant claimed that she broke her hand when 
she hit him. R. 271:121,130. During closing argument, defense counsel thus argued 
that Deborah's hand had never been flung back into the bookshelf as she had 
claimed. R. 271:190-92, 202-03. 
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Defendant asked the jury to acquit him of burglary and criminal mischief 
based on the fact that he paid the rent on the apartment and allegedly lived there at 
the time of the confrontation. R. 271: 180-204. Defendant also asked the jury to 
acquit him of aggravated assault based on his claim thai Deborah had been the 
aggressor during their physical confrontation, as well as the fact that any injury to 
Deborah's hand had been caused when she punched him. R. 271:180-204. 
Discussions and instructions regarding the intent element 
of aggravated assault 
As noted, the State alleged that Defendant committed aggravated assault 
under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103(1)(a). R. 5. Under that statute, a "person 
commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and 
he . . . intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another/' This language was 
submitted to the jury in Instruction # 14, defining aggravated assault as: 
1. That on or about April 6, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, 
LARRY HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily injury. 
9 
R. 186.4 
During trial, the prosecutor repeatedly stressed that the State's theory was 
that Defendant intentionally caused the injuries to Deborah's hand. During the 
opening statement, the prosecutor claimed that the jury must decide what 
Defendant's "intent" was "when Debby Cuddeback's hand was injured. Did he 
intend to cause injuries to her, such as the breaking of her metacarpal" bones? R. 
272:12. After summarizing the anticipated evidence, the prosecutor asserted that 
the jury would be "convinced that he intended to cause serious bodily injury." R. 
272:15. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor again stressed that the jury must 
decide whether Defendant "intentionally or knowingly committed an assault on 
Deborah Cuddeback," and whether he "intentionally caused serious bodily injury" 
to her. R. 271:178. The prosecutor argued that Defendant "intentionally caused" 
the injuries to her hand when he "grabbed her hand and . . . threw it back behind 
her head. She was trying to protect herself, and he grabbed her hand and threw it. 
He intentionally caused the serious bodily injury." R. 271:178. Summarizing the 
4
 The State has attached a complete copy of the jury instructions as 
Addendum C to this brief. 
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case at the close of argument, the prosecutor again stressed that the question was 
whether Defendant had "intentionally [broken] Debby's hand." R. 271:179.5 
The trial court gives a general instruction defining intentional conduct 
As noted, the specific statutory elements of aggravated assault were correctly 
set forth in Instruction 1J \l 186. Instructions 15-18 then defined a number oi the 
terms specific to that crime. R. 187-89. 
After issuing a series of intervening instructions regarding other aspects of the 
case (such as the elements of criminal mischief and the principles of self-defense), R. 
190-93, Instructions 24-27 set forth a series of general principles regarding 
intentional conduct. R. 195-98. These instructions did not mention any of the three 
crimes at issue by name, nor were these instructions specific to any particular crime. 
R. 196-98. Instead, they addressed such issues as the jury's ability to infer intent 
5
 The statute defines "serious bodily injury" as an injury that creates a 
"serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-601(11) (West 2004). In the pro se portion of the briefing at the court of 
appeals, Defendant argued that a broken hand does not meet this standard. Aplt. 
Br., addendum A (14-16). The court of appeals did not accept that claim, this Court 
did not grant certiorari on that issue, and Defendant does not re-raise it here. 
In any event, a broken bone which results in long-term impairment satisfies 
that element. See State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, f f 18-20, 993P.2d232. 
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from circumstantial evidence and the distinction between intent and motive. R. 195-
98. 
Among these was Instruction 27, which offered the statutory definitions for 
intentional and knowing conduct. R. 198. As set forth in Instruction 27, a "person 
engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result/7 R. 198. This instruction was 
a verbatim recitation of the definition of intentional conduct from Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-2-103(1) (West 2004). 
Before submitting the case to the jury, the trial court discussed the proposed 
jury instructions with the parties. R. 271:147-61. During that discussion, defense 
counsel objected to various instructions. R. 271:147-61. But defense counsel never 
objected to Instruction 14, which set forth the elements of aggravated assault, nor 
did she object to Instruction 27, which set forth the statutory definition of intentional 
conduct. R. 271:147-61. Instead, after receiving the rulings on the objections she 
had offered, counsel affirmatively represented that she had no further objections. R. 
271:160. 
12 
Verdict & Appeal 
The jury convicted Defendant of aggravated assault and criminal mischief, 
but acquitted him of aggravated burglary. R. 212-14; 271: 219. Following 
sentencing, Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
His original appellate counsel filed a hybrid Anders/merits brief with the 
court of appeals. In Point I, counsel identified a number of issues that Defendant 
wished to raise, but then, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), argued 
that those issues were frivolous . Aplt. Br. 8-21. As an addendum, defense counsel 
attached a pro se memorandum from Defendant that had initially set forth his views 
of the issues he wished to raise on appeal, as well as Defendant's pro se "response" 
to the Anders brief that defense counsel had filed. Aplt. Br., addenda A & B. 
In Point II of the brief, defense counsel argued the merits of the one claim that 
he found to be non-frivolous. Aplt. Br. 21-23. Counsel argued that Jury Instruction 
14(2) was incorrect when it stated that the mental state for the underlying assault 
could be either "intentional" or "knowing" conduct. Aplt. Br. 21-23. According to 
counsel, the assault could be proven only through intentional conduct. Id. But 
defense counsel never raised any additional claim regarding Instruction 14(4), 
which had required the State to prove that Defendant intentionally caused the 
serious bodily injury. Counsel also did not argue that Instruction 27 had improperly 
13 
modified Instruction 14(4) in a manner that allowed Defendant to be convicted of 
aggravated assault if he only intended the conduct, as opposed to also intending the 
result. See Aplt. Br. 21-23. 
In response, the State filed a brief in which it first agreed with defense counsel 
that the Anders issues were frivolous. Aplee. Br. 3-4. The State accordingly did not 
file a substantive response to those issues. See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168,170 
(Utah 1981) ("Because of the special nature of the Anders brief, the attorney general 
[is not] expected to file a responsive brief/7). Instead, the State limited its response 
to the one claim argued by defense counsel: whether an assault could be proven 
through both intentional and knowing conduct. Aplee. Br. 4-6. Like defense 
counsel, the State did not make any arguments about what a defendant must intend 
in order to convert a simple assault into an aggravated assault. 
On November 13, 2009, the court of appeals issued an unpublished 
memorandum decision denying Defendant's claims. The court first agreed that the 
Anders issues were "indeed frivolous/' State v. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330 at *1. 
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The court also agreed with the State that a simple assault can be based on 
intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. See id. at *2-3.6 
The court of appeals then turned to a question that had not been briefed by 
defense counsel or the State: whether Instruction 27s definition of intentional 
conduct had improperly modified the intent requirement tor aggravated assault. 
Id. at *3.7 In its brief analysis of the issue, the court of appeals concluded that 
Instruction 27 had allowed a defendant to be convicted of aggravated assault if he 
"intend[ed] the act that resulted] in serious bodily injury/' regardless of whether he 
intended to cause the serious bodily injury. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330 at *3. The 
court of appeals then concluded that this was a correct interpretation of the 
aggravated assault statute. Id. 
Defendant filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari, asking for review of 
23 different issues. Pet. Cert. 1-9. This Court granted Defendant's petition, but only 
6
 As recognized by the court of appeals, this meant that Instruction 14(2) was 
actually more stringent than required by law. Specifically, although the State could 
have proven the underlying assault through intentional, knowing, or reckless 
conduct, Instruction 14(2) required the State to show that the underlying assault was 
intentional or knowing. See Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330 at *3 n.3 As a result, "by 
not including recklessness as a basis for a finding of assault, the State was held to a 
higher standard of proof for that mens rea element than required by the statute/7 Id. 
7
 As discussed below, the only place where Defendant arguably made this 
claim was in his pro se response to the Anders brief that had been filed by counsel. 
See Aplt. Br., addendum B (3). 
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with respect to two issues: first, whether "the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
district court's instruction defining intentional conduct in relation to causation of 
serious bodily injury under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a)"; and second, 
"[w]hether Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective." (Addendum D). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant claims that the court of appeals incorrectly held that he 
could be convicted of aggravated assault whether or not he intended to cause the 
serious bodily injury, so long as he intended the act that caused the serious bodily 
injury. The State agrees that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the 
mental state required for aggravated assault. But this Court should still affirm the 
court of appeals' result for two reasons. First, the jury instructions below accurately 
informed the jury that it could convict Defendant only if it first found that he 
intended to cause the serious bodily injury. Thus, the court of appeals' affirmance 
was correct, albeit for the wrong reason. Second, the court of appeals should not 
have reached the issue in the first instance, because Defendant's claim regarding 
Instruction 27 was barred by the invited error doctrine. 
Point II: Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance when his 
counsel failed to object to Instruction 27. But that instruction correctly set forth the 
controlling law. Thus, counsel did not perform deficiently by not objecting. 
16 
Defendant's claim also fails because he cannot show prejudice. As explained 
above, the instructions plainly and correctly instructed the jury that it had to find 
that Defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury. That the jury would have 
understood this is buttressed by the fact that the prosecution never argued that 
Defendant should be convicted merely because he intended the underlying conduct. 
Rather, the prosecution accurately argued that the jury must find that Defendant 
intended to cause serious bodily injury. 
Moreover, the evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly showed that 
Defendant did intend to cause serious bodily injury. Defendant broke down his 
victim's door in a profane rage, attacked her, choked her to the point of near-
unconsciousness, and then threatened to kill her. Under these circumstances, there 
is no reasonable probability that the result would have been different with an 
amended Instruction 27.s 
As noted above, Defendant was convicted of both aggravated assault and 
criminal mischief. In his brief, he attacks only the conviction for aggravated assault. 
17 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY SET FORTH 
THE MENTAL STATE REQUIRED FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that he 
could be convicted of aggravated assault regardless of whether he actually intended 
to cause "serious bodily injury." Pet. Br. 6-10. The State agrees that the court of 
appeals' analysis on this issue was incorrect. But this Court should still affirm the 
result because the instructions correctly instructed the jury that it had to find that 
Defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury. 
A, The court of appeals erred when it concluded that a defendant 
could be convicted of aggravated assault under the prior statute 
without intending to inflict serious bodily injury. 
Under the statute in effect at the time of this crime, aggravated assault had 
two elements. First, the State was required to prove that Defendant //commit[ted] 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a) (West 
2004). Because there was no statutorily prescribed mental state for simple assault, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004), the State could prove the underlying 
assault through intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-102 (West 2004) ("when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable 
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mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility"); cf. State v. Aikin, 2006 
UT App 155, 1 9,135 P.3d 894; State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175,1177-78 (Utah App. 
1994). Second, once the State proved an assault, it had to prove that the assault was 
aggravated under either Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103(l)(a) or -103(l)(b). 
In this case, the State proceeded only under § 76-5-103(1)(a), which increased 
a simple assault to an aggravated assault when the defendant "intentionally 
cause[d] serious bodily injury to another/7 This Court has interpreted that provision 
to mean that the defendant must have intended the result— i.e., that he must have 
intended to inflict a "serious bodily injury," as opposed to merely intending the 
conduct that caused the serious bodily injury. See In re Besendorfer, 568 P.2d 742,744 
(Utah 1977) ("To support a conviction under Sec. 76-5-103(1)(a),... the state must 
prove the accused intentionally caused serious body injury, viz., that he had a 
specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim..."); State v. Howell, 554 
P.2d 1326,1328 (Utah 1976) (same). 
In the opinion below, the court of appeals held otherwise, concluding that it 
"is enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement if the defendant intends the act that 
results in serious bodily injury." Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, *3. The State 
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therefore agrees with Defendant that the court of appeals' interpretation of the 
previous version of the statute was incorrect.9 
B. This Court should affirm because the instructions set forth the 
correct mental state. 
Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the instructions in this case were correct 
under the law discussed above. Specifically, these instructions allowed Defendant 
to be convicted of aggravated assault only if the jury concluded that he intended to 
cause serious bodily injury. Thus, although the court of appeals erred in its 
interpretation of the aggravated assault statute, this Court should affirm on this 
alternate ground. See Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, If 13, 234 P.3d 1100 (an 
appellate court may affirm on alternate grounds that are apparent on the record); 
Debiy v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) (same). 
When interpreting jury instructions, this Court interprets the instructions "as 
a whole, rather than in isolated segments/7 See State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, Tf 24,116 
P.3d 360; accord Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, | 37, 993 P.2d 191 ("If the jury 
9
 The aggravated assault statute was amended in 2010 to remove the intent 
element at issue in this appeal. Whereas the old statute required the defendant to 
intend to inflict seriously bodily injury, the new version requires only that the 
defendant commit a simple assault while using "means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury/' Utah Code § 76-5-103(1)(b) (2010). 
To avoid confusion in future cases, this Court should note that the statutory 
analysis in this case is based on a version of the statute no longer in effect. 
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instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error 
does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate 
as it might have been/' (Quotations and citation omitted.)). 
Here, Instruction # 14 defined the elements of aggravated assault as: 
1. That on or about April 6, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, 
LARRY HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily injury. 
R. 186 (emphasis added). 
Instruction 14's separately numerated structure was significant, because it 
differentiated the mental state required for an underlying assault (Instruction 14(2)) 
from the mental state required for the aggravator (Instruction 14(4)). With respect to 
the aggravator, Instruction 14(4) correctly instructed the jury that it could convict 
Defendant of aggravated assault only if it found that he "intentionally caused 
serious bodily injury/' This was the exact language set forth in the aggravated 
assault statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a). 
Defendant recognizes this in his brief, acknowledging that Instruction 14 
"correctly instructed [the jury] as to the elements of aggravated assault." Pet. Br. 7. 
21 
Despite this, Defendant argues that Instruction 27 incorrectly modified Instruction 
14 by allowing the jury to convict him even if he did not "intend the result, i.e., 
serious bodily injury." Pet. Br. 7. But Defendant's interpretation of how Instruction 
27 affected the jury's consideration of the aggravated assault charge is incorrect. 
Instruction 27 was a general definitions instruction that defined intentional 
and knowing conduct. This instruction was not limited to any particular crime, but 
was instead applicable to all three crimes at issue, insofar as each of them contained 
individual elements that could be proven through intentional or knowing conduct. 
See R. 181 (aggravated burglary), 186 (aggravated assault), 190 (criminal mischief). 
This does not mean, however, that all of Instruction 27 applied to all of the 
elements of all of the crimes. Instead, Instruction 27 applied only on a clause-
specific basis. For example, Instruction 27 defined knowing conduct. But while 
Instruction 14 allowed the underlying assault to be proven through intentional or 
knowing conduct, it expressly stated that the aggravator could be proven only 
through an intended result. R. 186. Thus, on its face, Instruction 27's definition of 
knowing conduct would have been inapplicable to that particular element. 
More importantly, Instruction 27's definition of intentional conduct was 
multi-faceted as well. Specifically, it included definitions of both intended acts and 
intended results, stating that a "person engages in conduct intentionally . . . with 
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respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result/' R. 198 
(emphasis added). 
Contrary to Defendant's claim, that instruction did not state that the 
definitions of intended conduct and intended results were interchangeable. Instead, 
as noted, Instruction 27 separated the definition of intended conduct from the 
definition of intended results through use of the disjunctive "or." 
Thus, Instruction 27 told the jury how to interpret any element that called for 
either intentional conduct or an intended result. In other words, if an individual 
element required intentional conduct, Instruction 27 required the jury to conclude 
that it was Defendant's "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct." R. 
198. But if an individual element instead required an intended result, Instruction 27 
required the jury to conclude that Defendant's "conscious objective or desire [was] 
to .. . cause the result." R. 198. 
Read together, Instructions 14 and 27 correctly set forth the governing law as 
dictated by statute. Specifically, Instruction 14(2)-(3) set forth the simple assault 
element, directing the jury to first determine whether Defendant "intentionally or 
knowingly committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback." R. 186. This referred to 
Defendant's conduct. Thus, Instruction 27 directed the jury to consider whether it 
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was Defendant's "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct" — i.e. to 
assault Deborah. R. 186. 
Instruction 14(4) then set forth the additional element required to convert 
simple assault to aggravated assault. Specifically, Instruction 14(4) required the jury 
to find that Defendant also "intentionally caused serious bodily injury." R. 186. 
This referred to an intended result. Thus, Instruction 27 clarified that Defendant 
could only be convicted of aggravated assault if the jury found that Defendant's 
"conscious objective or desire" was to "cause[ ] serious bodily injury." R. 186,190. 
The jury instructions in this case therefore correctly set forth the intent 
requirement for aggravated assault. This Court should accordingly affirm the court 
of appeals' conclusion that there was no error in the instructions. 
C. This Court may also affirm because the court of appeals should not 
have considered the claim where it was barred by the invited error 
doctrine. 
Even if these jury instructions were incorrect, the court of appeals' result 
should be affirmed because Defendant's claim regarding Instruction 27 was not 
properly before the court. Specifically, the court of appeals should have rejected the 
claim based on the invited error doctrine. 
Under the invited error doctrine, "a party on appeal cannot take advantage of 
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
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error/7 State v. Alfdtlawi, 2006 UT App 511, | 26, 153 P.3d 804 (quotations and 
citation omitted). This occurs when there are "[ajffirmative representations that a 
party has no objection to the proceedings... because such representations reassure 
the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the 
issues." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 16,128 P.3d 1171. In the context of jury 
instructions, invited error ordinarily occurs when a defendant "affirmatively 
approve[s] of the jury instructions at trial/' Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 26 
(alteration in original). But even where counsel "confirm[s] on the record that the 
defense had no objection to the instructions given by the trial court," or instead 
"fail[s] to object to an instruction when specifically queried by the court," the 
invited error doctrine applies. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 10, 86 P.3d 742. 
If the invited error doctrine applies, a defendant cannot obtain review of an 
issue, even for plain error or exceptional circumstances. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 
16,1| 9; Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f^ 26. Instead, a defendant can obtain review 
only by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in inviting the error. See State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-60 (Utah 1989). 
Here, Defendant's trial counsel objected to a number of proposed instructions, 
but she never objected to Instruction 14 or Instruction 27. R. 271; 147-61. Instead, 
counsel affirmatively represented that she had no further objections to any of the 
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remaining instructions. R. 271:160. Thus, Defendant invited any error with respect 
to this issue, and the court of appeals should accordingly have denied this claim on 
this basis. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT16, f 9; Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 26. 
Granted, the State did not argue invited error below. However, this was 
because defense counsel never raised this claim on appeal. Instead, he argued only 
that Instruction 14(2) (regarding simple assault) was incorrect. See Aplt. Br. 21-23. 
To the extent that this was raised at all, it was only raised in Anders portion of the 
brief. As near as the State can determine, Defendant did not ever raise this claim in 
his initial Anders brief. Instead, the only place where Defendant even arguably 
raised that issue was on page 3 of addendum B, which was his pro se "response" to 
the Anders brief filed by counsel. There, he apparently argued for the first time that 
Instruction 27 was incorrect because it "fails to define [the crime] specifically to 
intentionally causes serious bodily injury." Aplt. Br., addendum B (3). But 
Defendant did not specifically claim that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel with respect to that claim. Moreover, as noted above, the State was not 
required to offer a substantive response to arguments made in his Anders brief, let 
alone arguments that had been raised for the first time in what was essentially 
Defendant's reply to his counsel's objections. See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168,170 
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(Utah 1981) ("Because of the special nature of the Anders brief, the attorney general 
[is not] expected to file a responsive brief/'). 
In short, as a result of defense counsel's conscious decision at trial not to 
object to Instruction 27, the invited error doctrine applied. And as a result of the 
invited error doctrine, Defendant could obtain review of that instruction only by 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Given that neither Defendant nor his 
counsel raised any ineffective assistance claim regarding Instruction 27 in the 
briefing below, the court of appeals should not have reviewed this claim at all. But 
having chosen to do so, it should have recognized that any error was invited. This 
Court may therefore affirm on that alternate basis.10 
In its opinion, the court of appeals suggested that although Defendant had 
"failed to object to these instructions in the trial court/7 the State had not "contested] 
[its] review of these issues" for plain error. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330 at * 2 n.l 
(emphasis added). In its brief, however, the State only substantively responded to 
the single claim raised by defense counsel — i.e. that Instruction 14(2) inaccurately set 
forth the mental state for simple assault. Aplee. Br. 4-6. Given that settled 
precedent controlled that issue, the State did indicate that it was not arguing invited 
error regarding that particular instruction. Aplee. Br. 4 n.2. 
But as noted above, Defendant's claim here is not based on Instruction 14. To 
the contrary, he agrees that that instruction was correct. Pet. Br. 7. Instead, his 
claim is based on Instruction 27, which was neither challenged nor argued in the 
briefing below. The State's limited concession below therefore does not apply. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HE RECEIVED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHEN HIS TRIAL COUNSEL DID 
NOT OBJECT TO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
This Court also granted certiorari to review "[wjhether Petitioner's trial 
counsel was ineffective." Addendum D. In his brief, Defendant raises only one 
claim of ineffective assistance: that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
to Instruction 27. Pet. Br. 6-14. As discussed above, however, Defendant never 
raised that claim in the trial court, nor did he or his counsel brief it in the hybrid 
Anders brief that was filed with the court of appeals. This Court should accordingly 
decline to address this issue now. 
But even if reached, the claim should be rejected on its merits. To establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show: (1) that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient - i.e, that it did not meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and (2) that"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). Defendant's 
claim fails under both prongs. 
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First, counsel did not perform deficiently. When assessing deficient 
performance claims, there is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance/7 State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 
45, Tf 38,122 P.3d 543 (quotations and citation omitted). Defense counsel does not 
perform deficiently by not filing a futile motion. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 
f 26,1 P.3d 546; State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34, 989 P.2d 52. 
As explained above, Instruction 27 tracked the statutory language and was a 
correct statement of the law. Moreover, it did not incorrectly modify the mental 
state required for aggravated assault. There was accordingly no basis for counsel to 
have objected, and Defendant's deficient performance claim should therefore be 
rejected for that reason. 
Second, Defendant has not shown that any deficient performance prejudiced 
him. Under Strickland's prejudice prong, "[i]t is not enough for the defendant to 
show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding/7 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Rather, Defendant must demonstrate that "a reasonable 
probability exists that but for the deficient conduct [he] would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, % 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
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Defendant claims that if Instruction 27 had been omitted or modified, the jury 
"likely would have concluded that the evidence [did] not support an aggravated 
assault conviction." Pet. Br. 13. Defendant is wrong for two reasons. 
First, the State's theory of the case—and, thus, the resulting conviction—was 
always predicated on the correct assertion that Defendant had to intend to inflict 
serious bodily injury. During opening statement, the prosecutor explained that the 
jury must decide whether Defendant's "intent" was to injure his victim, "such as the 
breaking of her metacarpal" bones. R. 272:12. The prosecutor also argued that after 
hearing the evidence, the jury would be "convinced that [Defendant] intended to 
cause serious bodily injury." R. 272:15. During closing argument, the prosecutor 
again stressed that the jury had to decide whether Defendant had "intentionally 
caused serious bodily injury" to the victim, and, more specifically, whether he had 
"intentionally [broken] Debby's hand." R. 271:178,179. The prosecutor thus asked 
the jury to convict Defendant because he had "intentionally caused the serious 
bodily injury." R. 271:178. 
The State never argued that Defendant should be convicted of aggravated 
assault merely because he intended the conduct, and nothing in Instruction 27 
suggested that the jury should disregard Instruction 14(4)'s clear command that he 
had to intend to inflict serious bodily injury. Thus, if Instruction 27 had been 
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omitted or modified, the evidentiary picture, Defendant's arguments, and the State's 
arguments would all have remained the same. Given this, there is no reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have somehow been different. 
Second, the evidence in this case overwhelmingly supported the conclusion 
that Defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury. Intent can be proven 
through circumstantial evidence, and it can also be "inferred from the actions of the 
defendant or from surrounding circumstances/7 State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 43,994 
P.2d 177; see also State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,784 (Utah 1992). Moreover, "a person 
is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts." State v. 
Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856,859 (Utah 1981); see also 6A C.J.S. Assault § 95 (2004) (stating 
that an accused may be held liable for injuries that are "the natural and probable 
consequence of the wrongful act"). 
Defendant was "very angry and screaming and yelling" when he approached 
Deborah's door and kicked it out of its frame. R. 272:50-51. He then grabbed her by 
the neck, threw her over a couch, and began choking her. R. 272:51. When she told 
him that "he was hurting [her]," Defendant responded that he "was going to kill" 
her. R. 272: 51-52. After "almost black[ing] out" from lack of oxygen, Deborah 
managed to temporarily escape by jabbing at Defendant's face with her fingernails. 
R. 272: 52-53. But Defendant then chased her, tackled her, and began attacking her 
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again. R. 272:53. During the ensuing struggle, Defendant "grabbed [her] wrist and 
threw [her] hand backwards/7 smashing it into a large wooden object against the 
wall. R. 272: 55-56. He did so with enough force that the bone beneath her index 
finger was "shattered into dozens of pieces" and was "displaced." R. 271: 39. 
When reviewing a jury verdict, "appellate courts may rely on the 
presumption that the jury properly took into account conflicting evidence and 
believed the evidence that supported the verdict." State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70,14, 
167 P.3d 1074. Here, a "natural and probable consequence[ ]" of intentionally 
slamming a person's hand against a hard object with great force is that the person's 
hand will be broken, thereby supporting a presumption that Defendant intended 
that result. Sisneros, 631 P.2d at 859. When viewed in light of that presumption, 
Defendant's "actions" and the "surrounding circumstances" show that Defendant 
intended to inflict serious bodily injury. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, | 43. Specifically, 
Defendant was extremely angry from the outset of their confrontation, showed a 
willingness to use force when he kicked Deborah's door out of its frame, and 
showed an intent to harm, if not kill, Deborah when he attacked her, choked her to 
the point of almost blacking out, as well as by telling her that he intended to kill her. 
In response, Defendant now suggests that the jury might have thought he was 
acting in self-defense when he slammed Deborah's hand back against the wooden 
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object. Pet. Br. 13. But that is contrary to the account he gave at trial. There, 
Defendant never acknowledged grabbing Deborah's hand and slamming it back at 
all, but instead claimed that she had hurt her hand by punching him. R. 271:116-20. 
As evidenced by the verdict, the jury did not believe Defendant. In any event, the 
jury was specifically instructed that Defendant was entitled to act in self-defense. R. 
191-93. In spite of this instruction, the jury convicted Defendant—thereby 
necessarily rejecting any claim that Defendant was acting in self defense. 
In short, Defendant's argument ultimately rests upon the assertion that while 
he was willing to break down Deborah's door, attack her, and potentially kill her by 
choking her, he never intended to inflict serious bodily injury. The existing record 
shows that the jury disagreed, and there is no reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been different if Instruction 27 had been altered. Defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim should accordingly be rejected.11 
11
 In his brief, Defendant additionally claims that the trial court committed 
plain error by not striking Instruction 27 sua sponte. Pet. Br. 11. As discussed above, 
however, Defendant invited any error by approving that instruction. As a result, he 
cannot obtain relief under the plain error doctrine. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction for 
aggravated assault. 
Respectfully submitted January I \ , 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
4- b.T 
RYAN D./TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
In any event, even if the plain error doctrine is properly at issue, it does not 
provide a basis for relief. Specifically, there was no obvious error with respect to 
Instruction 27, because Instruction 27 was a verbatim recitation of a controlling 
statute that did not even purport to modify the elements instruction that defined 
aggravated assault. In addition, even if Instruction 27 was obviously incorrect, 
Defendant still suffered no prejudice because the State never relied on the incorrect 
interpretation of it in this case. 
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Before Judges Bench, Thorne, and McHugh. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Larry Lewis Hutchings appeals his convictions for aggravated 
assault and criminal mischief. Hutchings raises multiple issues 
on appeal, challenging his convictions. With respect to all but 
one of those issues, Hutchings's lawyer has filed an Anders 
brief, and Hutchings has filed a memorandum to supplement 
counsel's brief. See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738 (1967) (describing the procedures that appointed counsel must 
follow when he believes his client4s claims on appeal are 
frivolous); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1981) 
(adopting Anders requirements "as an expression of the 
requirements of due process of law" under the Utah Constitution) . 
Because our independent review convinces us that the issues 
identified by Hutchings's counsel in the Anders brief (the Anders 
issues) are indeed frivolous, see generally State v. Romano, 29 
Utah 2d 237, 507 P.2d 1025, 1025 (1973) (defining "frivolous" as 
"having no basis in fact or law"), we do not consider those 
issues further. See Clayton, 639 P.2d at 170 (holding that an 
appellate court may grant a withdrawal and affirm a conviction if 
it unanimously determines that an appeal is wholly frivolous). 
Apart from the Anders issues, appellate counsel argues that 
the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the culpable 
mental state required for aggravated assault and the definition 
of "intentional."1 "Whether a jury instruction correctly states 
the law presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 1 13, 193 P.3d 92. 
The jury instruction on aggravated assault provided, 
Before you can convict . . . HUTCHINGS 
. . . of Aggravated Assault, . . . you must 
find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, . . . HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on [his 
girlfriend]; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to her. 
We agree with the State that the jury instruction correctly 
listed the elements of aggravated assault, including the culpable 
mental states. 
Aggravated assault requires that a person commit "assault as 
defined in [Utah Code s]ection 76-5-102, and . . . intentionally 
cause [] serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-103(1) (a) (2008) (emphasis added).2 An " [a]ssault is . . . an 
act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another." Id. § 76-5-102. Because the assault statute 
does not provide the culpable mental state required to support a 
^Although Hutchings failed to object to these instructions 
in the trial court, he requests that we review them under the 
plain error doctrine. The State does not contest our review of 
these issues. 
2Because it is irrelevant to this appeal, we need not 
address the alternative element of aggravated assault, that is, 
the use of a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce 
death in the commission of the assault, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-103 (1) (b) (2008) . 
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conviction, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal responsibility." Id. § 76-2-102. To be 
liable for aggravated assault, however, the defendant must also 
have intentionally caused serious bodily injury. See id. § 76-5-
103(1) (a). Thus, there are actually two mens rea requirements 
that must be met to convict a defendant of aggravated assault: 
the first is the intent, knowledge, or recklessness included in a 
simple assault charge; the second is the requirement that the 
defendant intentionally cause serious bodily injury. The 
challenged jury instruction correctly identified each of these 
mental state requirements.3 Accordingly, we reject counsel's 
claim that the jury instruction was erroneous.4 
Finally, Hutchings challenges the instruction to the jury 
that defined "intentional" conduct. That instruction stated, "A 
person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Hutchings 
argues that to be guilty of aggravated assault he must have 
intended to cause the serious bodily injury suffered by the 
victim, not simply the conduct that resulted in the serious 
bodily injury. We disagree. It is enough to satisfy the mens 
rea requirement if the defendant intends the act that results in 
serious bodily injury. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 
n.l (Utah 1984) (upholding nearly identical instructions for 
intent). 
Because counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders 
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and because we confirm that 
the Anders issues are frivolous, we grant counsel's request to 
withdraw with respect to the Anders issues only and affirm the 
trial court's rulings with respect to those issues. In addition, 
the jury instructions properly informed the jury of the elements 
3Indeed, by not including recklessness as a basis for a 
finding of assault, the State was held to a higher standard of 
proof for that mens rea element than required by the statute. 
4Because we conclude that the jury instruction was proper, 
we need not address Hutchings's claim that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer failed to 
object to the instruction. 
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of aggravated assault, including the mental states required. 
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
William A. ihorne Jr., Judge 
20080681-CA 4 
Addendum B 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-103 (West 2003) Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circum-
stances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his con-
duct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an or-
dinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to cir-
cumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circum-
stances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circum-
stances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102 (West 2003) Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to anoth-
er; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily in-
jury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury 
to another. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-103 (West 2003) Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Sec-
tion 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Addendum C 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
_ARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS, ] 
Defendant, 
> JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1 Case No. 061902496 FS 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
The Court, in its charge to the jury, gives the following instructions numbered one (1) through 
( *fC/) inclusive. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
This is a criminal case. 
The defendant, Larry Lewis Hutchings, has been charged in a duly filed Information with the 
ffense(s) of Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Assault, Criminal Mischief, on or about April 6, 2006 
i Salt Lake County, Utah. 
This Information only alleges the defendant committed the offense and is not to be regarded 
5 a statement of facts proved in this case. 
The defendant has pled Not Guilty . This plea casts upon the prosecution the full burden of 
oving beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of each crime charged. 
The fact that the defendant has been charged is not evidence of guilt. No inference or 
esumption adverse to the defendant or State should be drawn because of it. 
/ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
easonable doubt. The presumption of innocence is not a mere term to be disregarded by the jury 
at pleasure. It is a substantial, essential part of the law, and is binding upon the jury. This 
^resumption is intended, so far as human agency is capable, to guard against the danger of an 
nnocent person being unjustly punished. The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail 
n the minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt 
Df the defendant. Where there is reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some 
F you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to 
•ove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the State's proof must be more 
Dwerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the 
Pendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and 
criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on 
)ur consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the 
ime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hard, you think there is a real possibility 
at he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. 
V, 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is my responsibility as judge to insure that (1) evidence is presented according to law, (2) 
o instruct the jury as to the law, and (3) to rule on objections made by the attorneys during the 
rial. 
No statement or ruling I make is intended to indicate any opinion I have concerning the facts 
)f the case. Disregard any expression seeming to indicate such an opinion. You are the exclusive 
udges of the facts. 
f ^*r* 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
At time throughout the trial I rule whether certain offered evidence might properly be 
Emitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons for such rulings and are not to draw any 
iferences from them. Whether or not evidence is admissible is purely a question of law. In 
Emitting evidence to which an objection is made, I do not determine what weight should be given 
jch evidence; or pass on the credibility of the witness. You are not to consider evidence offered 
j t not admitted, nor any evidence stricken. Where an objection was sustained, do not speculate 
hat the answer might have been or the reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is your responsibility as jurors to (1) determine the facts from the evidence, (2) to follow 
he law as instructed by me, and (3) to reach a verdict based upon the evidence, matters judicially 
noticed, or stipulations of the parties. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, LARRY HUTCHINGS, of the offense of 
Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, LARRY 
HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling or Deborah Cuddeback; 
4. With the intent to commit an assault on any person; and 
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary the defendant caused 
bodily injury to Deborah Cuddeback, who was not a participant in the crime. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I. 
? 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
"Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at 
night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or any 
portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and when the actor 
is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
. / / INSTRUCTION NO 
'Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor 
* *•**# i 
INSTRUCTION NO. \1 
When a person unlawfully enters a building with the intent to commit an assault on any 
person, the crime of burglary is committed and successful completion of the intended assault 
need not be shown. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / / 
Before you can convict the defendant, LARRY HUTCHINGS, of the crime of 
Aggravated Assault, as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, LARRY 
HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily injury to her. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in count II of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION N O . _ j f 5 _ 
Assault is 
(a) an intentional attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another, or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily to another: or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. IC 
'Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
-*rrC/ 
INSTRUCTION NO. ir 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, LARRY HUTCHINGS, of the crime of Criminal 
Mischief, as charged in count III of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, LARRY 
HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Damaged, defaced, or destroyed; 
4. The property of Deboarah Cuddeback; and 
5. That the pecuniary loss was less than $300. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Criminal Mischief as charged in count III of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count III. 
it 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person as a 
result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission 
of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified if 
he or she: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to use 
force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) (i) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless he 
withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person 
his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person continues or threatens to 
continue the use of unlawful force; and 
w 
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves, 
constitute "combat by agreement": 
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or 
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right to be. 
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened 
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully entered 
or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c). 
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated assault. 
Any other felony which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as 
to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a 
forcible felony. 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1). the 
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or 
serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
You are instructed that laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish 
self-defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The laws of 
Utah require the defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show 
self-defense. If the defendant has done this, and if such evidence of self-defense 
when considered in connection with all other evidence in this case raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or if it raises a reason to believe that 
the defendant acted in self defense you must find him not guilty. The defendant 
has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if there is any basis 
in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. LJ . 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information. Each charge and 
the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the 
accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as 
to any other offense charged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes a purpose in so 
acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances. 
t 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or 
fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not be proven. The motive of an 
accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of 
state of mind or intent. 
zr 
INSTRUCTION NO. Zl 
To constitute the crime charged in the information there must be the joint operation of 
two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or 
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with the culpable mental state 
required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ / 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be received as 
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by 
education, study, and experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, and who 
is called as a witness, may give an opinion as to any such matter in which the witness is qualified 
as an expert and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and 
should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such opinion. 
You should give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and 
you may reject it if. in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound. 
w 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
vidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right 
o take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive 
or their testimony. You may consider the witnesses' deportment upon the witness stand, the 
easonableness of their statements, their frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity 
o know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should consider these 
natters together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you believe have a bearing on 
he truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statement. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and his 
Bstimony should be received and given the same consideration as you give to that of any witness, 
he fact that a defendant stands accused of a crime is not evidence of guilt and is no reason for 
ejecting the testimony. Weigh this testimony the same as you weigh the testimony of any other 
witness. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 I 
You have heard the testimony of a law enforcement official. The fact that a witness may be 
employed by the federal, state or local government as a law enforcement official does not mean 
:hat testimony is deserving of more or less consideration than that of any other witness. 
It is your decision, after reviewing all of the evidence, to give law enforcement testimony, 
and all other testimony, the weight you find it deserves. 
INSTRUCTION NO. n 
It is the responsibility of the attorneys to present evidence, to examine and cross-examine 
/itnesses, and to argue the evidence. No statement or argument of the attorneys is itself evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q-> 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of justice, upon either or 
both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the 
defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, whether of one kind 
or the other or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may 
carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of the testimony of 
every witness who, with any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part 
thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived. All other evidence 
admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, 
statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference 
the innocence or guilty of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. M 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile such conflict as far as you 
sasonably can. Where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must 
etermine from the evidence what the facts are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall 
etermine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall determine what the 
acts in this case are. Conscientiously consider all of the testimony, and all of the facts and 
ircumstances, which have a bearing on any issue; then determine what the facts are from that. 
You are not bound to believe all that the witnesses have testified to unless such testimony 
• reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. You may 
elieve one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer number in accordance with your 
onest convictions. The testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on one 
latter is naturally less convincing on other matters. If you believe a witness has testified falsely 
s to any material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of that testimony or give it such 
'eight as you think it entitled. 
INSTRUCTION NO. .IS 
It is your sworn duty as jurors to follow the law as the Court states it to you, even though 
rou think it is, or ought to be, otherwise. 
You should not be governed in your deliberations by sentiment, sympathy, prejudice, or public 
eeling. You must conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence, apply the 
aw to the case, and reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences may be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ZL 
Do not consider the subject of penalty or punishment in your deliberations. Such issues lie 
/ith the Court, and must not in any way affect your decision as to the guilt or innocence of a 
efendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. '}) / 
I have endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules of law necessary to your 
eaching a verdict. The applicability of some of these instructions will depend upon what you find 
he facts are. The fact that an instruction is given does not indicate it will always be necessary. If 
in instruction applies only to a state of facts you find does not exist, disregard the instruction. 
Do not single out any certain sentence, individual point or instruction. Consider the 
nstructions as whole and in light of each other. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
mportance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view toward 
caching an agreement. You each must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a 
onsideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to change an opinion if 
onvinced that it is erroneous. 
However, you should not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight 
f evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other 
jrors. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J 
The attitude of jurors at the beginning of deliberations is very important. It is rarely productive 
)r a juror, upon entering the jury room, to emphatically express an opinion on the case or to 
nnounce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. 
You are not partisans or advocates in this matter. You are judges. The final test of the quality 
f your service lies in the verdict you return, not in any opinions you hold as you retire. Your sworn 
bligation is to arrive at a just and proper verdict. 
% 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When you retire to deliberate, appoint one of your number as foreperson. 
This being a criminal case it requires unanimous concurrence of all the jurors to find a verdict. 
Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreperson and when found must be returned 
>y you into the Court. 
Your verdict in this case must be: 
GUILTY, as charged in the information, 
OR 
NOT GUILTY, as your deliberations may determine. 
When you have reached a verdict, notify the bailiff that your are ready to report to the Court. 
)ated: f^7 
/ 
Third District Court Judge 
Addendum D 
OftNtUW-1 
FE3 2'iK'J \ SEN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AODfMs \ o o 0 o ° F!LED 
H t r ^ ^ ] ^ ^ ^ UTAH APPELLATE COUPr 
FEB 1 g 2010 
State of Utah, " ^ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. Case No. 20100024-SC 
Larry Lewis Hutchings, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on January 7, 2010. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues. 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district 
court's instruction defining intentional conduct m relation to 
causation of serious bodily injury under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(1) (a) . 
2. Whether Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter, 
For The Court : 
2-/4-Dated 
Tatthew B. Durrant 
Assoc ia te Chief J u s t i c e 
0 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February 18, 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail or placed in the Interdepartmental mail 
service, or hand delivered to the parties listed below: 
LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS 68427 
PO BOX 250 
DRAPER UT 84020 
RYAN D TENNEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL BX 0854 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
LISA COLLINS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & LYN MACLEOD 
450 S STATE ST BX 1860 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this February 18, 2010. 
Judicial Assistant \ 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20100024 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE Case No. 061902496 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20080681 
